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IMMIGRATION PREEMPTION AFTER  
UNITED STATES v. ARIZONA 
OPENING STATEMENT 
 
Preemption of State and Local Immigration Laws Remains Robust 
 
KIT JOHNSON† 
Many people, frustrated with what they believe to be a failure of the 
federal government to police the nation’s borders, have sought to leverage 
state and local laws to do what the federal government has not: get tough on 
undocumented migrants. The primary stumbling block for these attempts is 
federal preemption as the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably 
exclusively a federal power.” DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).  
This June, in a victory for local movements against undocumented  
immigration, the Supreme Court held that federal law did not preempt an 
Arizona law requiring police to “make a ‘reasonable attempt . . . to deter-
mine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest’” 
whenever they reasonably believe the person is “unlawfully present in the 
United States.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012) 
(quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051(B) (2012)).  
The task now falls to lower courts to apply Arizona to the myriad other 
state and local laws coming down the pike. The en banc Fifth Circuit is 
presently considering whether a Dallas suburb may use a scheme of “occu-
pancy licenses” to prevent undocumented immigrants from living in rental 
housing within city limits. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers 
 
† Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law; J.D., 2000, University of 
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Branch, 675 F.3d 802, (5th Cir. 2012), vacated pending review en banc, 688 
F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012). Both the district court and a three-judge panel of 
the Fifth Circuit held that the ordinance was preempted. Id.at 806-07, 817. 
But the substance and style of the questions asked during the oral argument 
en banc suggests that several judges would like to overturn those decisions. 
Oral Argument, Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 10-10751 
(5th Cir. Sept. 19, 2012) (en banc), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ 
OralArgRecordings/10/10-10751_9-19-2012.wma. They should, however, affirm.  
A bit of background: Farmers Branch was an early leader in local laws 
aimed at undocumented immigrants. The city passed three rental housing 
ordinances in three years—2006, 2007, and 2008—each with the goal of 
keeping undocumented immigrants out of the Farmers Branch rental 
housing market. The 2006 ordinance was repealed after a Texas state court 
judge enjoined its enforcement for possible violations of the Texas Open 
Meetings Act. A federal court enjoined the enforcement of the 2007 
ordinance on the grounds that it was preempted by federal law, violated due 
process, and was void for vagueness. The city hopes the third time’s the 
charm with the 2008 ordinance now before the Fifth Circuit. 
The current Farmers Branch ordinance directs the city’s building in-
spector to “verify with the federal government” whether every  noncitizen 
occupant of rental housing is “an alien lawfully present in the United 
States.” Villas at Parkside Partners, 675 F.3d at 804 (internal citations 
omitted). Doing so might seem simple, but in practice, it is not. While the 
government can inform the city about the immigration status of a nonciti-
zen, lawful presence is a different, more complex question, and it is one the 
Department of Homeland Security has said it cannot or will not answer for 
inquiring municipalities. That being the case, under the Farmers Branch 
scheme, the determination of lawful presence falls to the city’s building 
inspector. And the current inspector in Farmers Branch has admitted, with 
admirable candor, that he is ill-equipped to make such a determination. Yet, 
under the 2008 ordinance, he must. The determination is crucial because if 
an occupant is deemed “not lawfully present,” the ordinance requires the 
inspector to revoke the occupant’s “occupancy license.” The license revoca-
tion then triggers criminal liability for both the occupant and the landlord if 
the occupant does not vacate. 
The 2008 ordinance poses obvious and serious equal protection and due 
process problems. While equal protection looms large in questions of how 
the ordinance will be enforced, due process concerns will likely constitute a 
fatal flaw for the scheme. But, unfortunately for opponents of the ordi-
nance, neither of these issues is currently before the Fifth Circuit. The sole 
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question presented in the en banc hearing concerns the scope of federal 
preemption in the immigration arena.  
Given the Fifth Circuit’s focus on preemption alone, supporters of the 
Farmers Branch ordinance were likely encouraged by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Arizona. But, while the Court upheld one part of the Arizona 
law, the Court also affirmed the continuing viability of immigration 
preemption, stating that “[t]he Government of the United States has broad, 
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. As a consequence, the Court held that Arizona 
could not make it a misdemeanor for non–U.S. citizens to fail to carry an 
alien registration document. Likewise, Arizona could not make it a misde-
meanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work 
in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contrac-
tor.” Id. at 2503 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2928(C)). Nor, under 
Arizona, may the state authorize its officers to undertake warrantless arrests 
of individuals believed to have committed any public offense making them 
removable from the United States. Id. at 2507. 
Federal power with respect to immigration is “exclusive” and includes 
the authority to determine who should and should not be allowed to remain 
in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2006). Thus, state and local 
governments may not create their own immigration policies. Arizona, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2506. They certainly cannot make their own choices about whether 
individuals should be allowed to remain within city limits when those 
decisions are based on immigration status.  
Farmers Branch argues that its ordinance does not interfere with the 
federal removal scheme, but rather “goes to extraordinary lengths” to avoid 
entanglement with federal decisionmaking. Brief of Appellant, the City of 
Farmers Branch, Texas, on Rehearing En Banc at 31, No. 10-10751 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 15, 2012). While Farmers Branch admits that its ordinance provides a 
“disincentive” to unlawful presence in the city, it argues that the ordinance 
never oversteps the municipality’s valid law-making authority. Id. at 32. Of 
course, this is all smoke and mirrors. The Farmers Branch ordinance offers 
no mere disincentive. It demands action—by the building inspector to bar, 
the landlord to evict, and the resident to leave. In a word, to remove.  
Preemption analysis should not depend upon the purpose behind a state 
or local law. Nonetheless, it is notable that Farmers Branch has intentionally 
entered into the business of immigration lawmaking. According to one of 
the city’s 2006 resolutions, Farmers Branch acted because of the federal 
government’s failure to deal with the “influx of illegal aliens . . . estimated 
in the millions . . . coming in across our most southerly border.” Villas at 
Parkside Partners, 675 F.3d at 805. Thus, the application of preemption to 
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invalidate the Farmers Branch ordinance is not lawyer-crafted legerdemain 
to frustrate a valid municipal purpose. Farmers Branch’s own, external 
purpose in ordinance-making invites such analysis. 
The city’s motivations go beyond its self-regard as a pint-sized Con-
gress. There is also a strong streak of nimbyism. Members of the city 
council have said that the goals of the enactments were to “mak[e] it 
difficult for illegal aliens to rent property in the City of Farmers Branch,” to 
“sen[d] a message to people who aren’t in the country legally, [that] Farm-
ers Branch is not the place for you,” and, ultimately, to “help reduce the 
illegal immigrant population in Farmers Branch.” Id. at 805 n.4, 806. 
During oral argument before the Fifth Circuit, one judge questioned 
whether housing was “somehow different” from other areas where state and 
local regulations governing noncitizens have been permitted, such as 
employment and public benefits. Indeed, housing is different, because it 
treads closer to the core of the Supreme Court’s concerns about federal 
control of immigration. In Truax v. Raich, a case concerning foreigners of 
lawful status, the Court reasoned that “to deny to aliens the opportunity of 
earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be tanta-
mount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in 
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.” 239 U.S. 33, 42 
(1915). The power to deny “entrance and abode,” the Court said, is like the 
power to remove foreign nationals: it is purely federal. Id. 
One might counter that this line of reasoning does not support preemption 
of the ordinance because Farmers Branch does not seek to repel foreign 
nationals generally, only those of “unlawful” status. Yet that line of argument is 
self-defeating. The federal government sets immigration policy, whether by 
conferring status on individuals or turning up or down the dials of immigration 
enforcement. Either way, it is not the business of state or local governments.  
Not only does the Farmers Branch ordinance interfere with the fed-
eral removal scheme, it also implicates foreign relations in a way the 
approved law in Arizona did not. The ordinance demands that foreign 
nationals identify themselves to the city and be subject to registration, 
investigation, and potentially, expulsion and conviction. Municipal 
authority is used to extend legal unwelcomeness to foreign nationals. 
Thus, within its city limits, Farmers Branch is pursuing a distinct 
foreign relations policy, something it may not do because federal control 
of foreign policy is absolute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that the federal government must be able to speak “with one voice.” 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07. There is no room for local interference 
because “[e]xperience has shown that international controversies of the 
gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or 
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imagined wrongs to another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a 
government.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).  
There remains the question of how to categorize the particular species of 
federal preemption that should be brought to bear against Farmers Branch. 
Making such a categorization is complicated by the fact that preemption 
doctrine is, in the words of Professor Caleb Nelson, something of “a 
muddle.” Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000). The 
question is not greatly significant, however, because multiple preemption 
theories apply to the 2008 ordinance. The law may be considered subject to 
“express preemption” on account of the federal statutory language regarding 
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3). The ordinance can also be viewed as 
subject to “field preemption” since the scheme of federal regulation govern-
ing removal and foreign relations is so pervasive that it allows no room for 
states to have their own removal policies. Finally, the theory of “conflict 
preemption” may be applied as the ordinance represents as “an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress” in the areas of removal and foreign policy. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; 
see also Nelson, supra, at 226-31 (providing a concise summary of express, 
field, and conflict preemption). 
Whatever line of preemption analysis applies, the bottom line is the 
same. Farmers Branch, like Arizona, “may have understandable frustrations 
with the problems caused by illegal immigration,” but that does not entitle 
it to “pursue policies that undermine federal law.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2510. The Fifth Circuit should affirm the panel’s decision and call the 
Farmers Branch ordinance what it is: an unconstitutional usurpation of the 
federal government’s exclusive authority over immigration law and policy. 
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REBUTTAL 
 
State Action on Immigration (Bad and Good) After Arizona v. United States 
 
PETER J. SPIRO† 
Arizona v. United States sounds deeply in the conventional wisdom that 
immigration regulation is an exclusively federal domain. But query whether 
that reasoning is sound. States and localities must continue to have some 
discretion in the immigration context as their officials interact with immi-
grants in myriad ways. “Subfederal” action unfriendly to immigrants in this 
arena will mostly be self-correcting as political and economic pressures are 
brought to bear. Perhaps more interesting is the possibility that cities and 
states will depart from federal policy in a way that benefits undocumented 
immigrants. Arizona establishes a regime of negotiated federalism. While 
reaffirming the axiom that immigration policy is an exclusively federal 
enterprise, Arizona also allows the federal government to validate increasing 
levels of subfederal discretion in the immigration arena. 
I agree with Professor Johnson that measures like the Farmers Branch 
ordinance currently before the Fifth Circuit are preempted under Arizona. 
When it struck down three of the four challenged sections of S.B. 1070, the 
Court set a low threshold for preemption. Some immigration restrictionists 
hailed the Court’s acceptance of the law’s controversial “papers please” 
provision, under which state law enforcement officials must make a deter-
mination of immigration status where there is reasonable suspicion to 
believe that a person is illegally present in the United States. But the Court 
appeared to do so only insofar as the requirement is meaningless on the 
ground. It was careful to interpret the “papers please” provision such that it 
did not supply a basis for detention by state authorities, and it left the door 
open to subsequent as-applied challenges on civil rights grounds. See 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509-10 (2012). The Court struck 
down other provisions that criminalized the failure to carry federal alien 
registration documents and the pursuit of unauthorized employment as 
interfering with federal enforcement priorities. See id. at 2501-08. Unlike 
the “papers please” provision, these measures would have had teeth. 
So too would the kind of rental occupancy measure contemplated by Farmers 
Branch, Hazelton, and other localities. Compare Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of 
Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012), vacated pending review en banc, 688 
 
†  Charles R. Weiner Professor of Law, Temple University Law School.  
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F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2012), with Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 
2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The doctrinal equation in these latter cases is 
not as simple as with Arizona’s registration and employment provisions. Both of 
those invalidated provisions of S.B. 1070 had clear federal cognates; federal 
immigration law regulates both alien registration and unauthorized employment, 
and Arizona’s laws had the potential to interfere with each. By contrast, there is 
no federal regime regulating the rental of property by undocumented aliens. But 
that wouldn’t stand in the way of a preemption finding. Prohibiting rental 
occupancy constitutes at least as great a “harassment of some aliens . . . whom 
federal officials determine should not be removed” as was confronted by the 
Court in Arizona. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2517. The Farmers Branch ordinance may 
not undermine a particular strain of federal immigration enforcement, but it 
would interfere with federal enforcement as a “harmonious whole.” Id. at 2502 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72 (1941)). 
That logic is reinforced by Justice Kennedy’s strong emphasis on the 
foreign relations implications of immigration policy. “Immigration policy,” 
he observed, “can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations 
for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in 
this country who seek the full protection of its laws. . . . Decisions of 
this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice.” Id. 
at 2506-07. By playing on the foreign relations theme, Kennedy telegraphed 
the exceptional, hair-trigger preemption standard that applies to other state 
activities implicating foreign relations. By situating immigration policy 
within the federal government’s broad power over foreign affairs, the Court 
reversed its typical preemption analysis, which, as part of a broader federal-
ism agenda, has been increasingly protective of state action. This framing of 
the issue bodes poorly for measures like the Farmers Branch ordinance. It 
puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of preemption. 
Justice Kennedy’s approach enjoys a polished judicial pedigree, beginning 
with the Court’s 1876 decision in Chy Lung v. Freeman and reinforced in 1941 in 
Hines v. Davidowitz (a case striking down a state measure which, like the Arizona 
law, imposed a registration–related regime). But the political times have changed. 
2012 is not 1876, or even 1941, and Arizona’s immigration-related laws are not 
going to lead us down the road to World War III. The dormant foreign affairs 
power is only justified insofar as state action results in significant externalities for 
the rest of the nation. That may once have been the case; if Arizona did some-
thing to offend Mexico, Mexico might retaliate in such a way as to injure, say, 
North Carolina, whose citizens had no say in Arizona’s lawmaking. But Mexico 
now understands that S.B. 1070 is Arizona’s responsibility alone and is unlikely to 
retaliate against the United States as a whole. The new global dynamic eliminates 
the need for foreign affairs exceptionalism, as well as its immigration subtheorem. 
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Even in Arizona’s wake, there remains significant room for state action 
relating to immigration. Nothing in the Arizona decision or the dormant 
foreign affairs power constrains the power of the federal political branches 
to affirmatively validate state action relating to immigration. In the lead-up 
to Arizona, the Court upheld an earlier Arizona law that mandated the 
revocation of business licenses for employers who hire unauthorized 
workers. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). Whiting 
applied a 1986 federal law that expressly preempted state measures relating 
to employer sanctions except in the context of business licensing. The 
Whiting Court generously interpreted the licensing exception. Id. at 1984-
85. By “preserving to the States the authority to impose sanctions through 
licensing laws, Congress did not intend to preserve only those state laws 
that would have no effect.” Id. Rather, Congress had included the states in 
the enforcement scheme. 
The states can manifest hostility to aliens in other ways. For example, 
they have discretion under federal law to extend or deny various public 
benefits to noncitizens (including legal immigrants). Although not without 
controversy, state and local jurisdictions can participate in immigration 
enforcement in partnership with the federal government through the 287(g) 
program. And even without federal approval, states have other tools in their 
anti-immigration tool kit. States get to decide whether to grant in-state 
tuition to undocumented immigrants. States appear to have discretion to 
decide whether so-called “childhood arrivals” recently granted deferred 
action status by the Obama Administration will be eligible for driver’s 
licenses and other benefits. And although the “papers please” device may 
lack teeth—federal immigration authorities have no obligation to respond to 
state-provided information that a particular individual is in the United 
States unlawfully—it unequivocally expresses anti-“illegals” sentiment.  
The political branches may well expand this room for state action. There 
is an understanding (reflected in Justice Kennedy’s opinion as well) that the 
burdens of undocumented immigration fall more heavily on some states 
than on others. Delegating decisionmaking to the state level may represent 
a workable compromise on a polarized issue. In the absence of comprehen-
sive immigration reform legislation, one can expect some level of discretion 
to be conceded by the executive branch. When comprehensive immigration 
reform comes, it is likely to include provisions giving a longer leash to the 
states on certain immigration-related questions. 
Even if the leash is let out, the states will not necessarily use it to the 
detriment of immigrants, at least if they care about their bottom lines. That 
is a key lesson of Arizona’s experience and that of a half dozen other states. 
These states have taken an economic hit after passing tough-on-
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immigration laws: lost convention and tourist dollars, crops left to rot in the 
fields for want of immigrant labor, and tarnished state brands. If Arizona 
had been left to its own devices, there is a good chance that S.B. 1070 would 
have been scaled back or repealed. Anti-immigrant legislation is not good 
for business in the hyper-competitive global economy, and states have 
strong incentives to shy away from anti-immigrant measures that are 
anything more than symbolic. 
Of course, Arizona’s logic would also seem to apply to state and local 
actions that benefit immigrants. Immigration federalism is a two-way 
street. Where cities and states have resisted federal immigration en-
forcement, the federal government has pushed back. The sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s and 1990s was snuffed out by federal legislation 
forbidding subfederal constraints on cooperation with federal immigra-
tion authorities. More recently, prominent subfederal leaders have 
pushed back on “Secure Communities,” a federal program that requires 
local law enforcement to report the criminal arrests of noncitizens and 
has sometimes resulted in the deportation of long-present aliens for 
minor crimes. Chicago passed an ordinance mandating nonparticipation 
with the program, and California would have followed suit but for a veto 
of the so-called Trust Act by Governor Jerry Brown.  
One might distinguish immigrant-friendly measures from hostile 
ones insofar as the former are unlikely to offend foreign sovereigns. 
Nevertheless, the political branches are unlikely to tolerate anything that 
looks like outright resistance to immigration enforcement. So long as 
they don't go too far, then, the states can roll out something like a 
welcome mat by opting for more generous benefits for immigrants. For 
instance, several states give the children of immigrants in-state tuition 
rates at state colleges and universities. 
Combining the good and the bad, there is also the possibility for partner-
ship in advancing immigration reform on a staggered basis. Legislators in 
Utah enacted a package that couples enhanced enforcement measures with a 
state-initiated guest worker program, under which some undocumented 
immigrants would be eligible for state–approved work authorization. The 
package followed in the wake of the Utah Compact, a balanced “declaration of 
principles,” supported by state civic, religious, and business leaders, to guide 
the state on immigration issues. The guest-worker component is almost surely 
invalid under Arizona in the absence of federal approval, which to date has 
not been forthcoming. Perhaps the second Obama Administration should 
give this initiative a closer look, especially if comprehensive immigration 
reform remains a nonstarter on Capitol Hill. Legislation at the state level 
might even help build momentum for action in Washington. 
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In short, in Arizona, the Supreme Court constricted the possibilities for 
unilateral state innovation on immigration, both good and bad. That does 
not stop the federal government from affirming state discretion. On bal-
ance, there is good reason to suspect that state policymaking can and should 
benefit immigrants over the long run. State activity relating to immigration 
is often decried as creating an unacceptable “patchwork.” But that’s an 
inherent feature of federalism, and there’s no obvious reason why immigra-
tion should be treated differently than other areas of regulation. In other 
strong, federal systems, Canada and Germany included, subfederal actors 
are key participants in immigration decisionmaking. Arizona notwithstand-
ing, we would be well served to undertake broader experimentation with 
immigration federalism. The Farmers Branch ordinance is likely to be 
struck down, but it is not clear that it should be. In any case, cities and 
states will continue to be important players on the immigration stage. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
The Benefits of a Tight Leash in a Field of Scapegoats 
 
KIT JOHNSON 
I agree with Professor Spiro that when Congress undertakes comprehen-
sive immigration reform, it should give a close look to states’ ideas about 
immigration. I say when and not if because, in the week following the 
presidential election, representatives from both political parties have 
indicated that immigration reform is going to be a priority for the 113th 
Congress. As House Speaker John Boehner put it, “[A] comprehensive 
approach is long overdue, and I’m confident that [we] can find the common 
ground to take care of this issue once and for all.” Jennifer Steinhauer, 
Speaker ‘Confident’ of Deal With White House on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/us/politics/boehner-
confident-of-deal-with-white-house-on-immigration.html. 
The sudden interest in federal immigration reform is driven, of course, 
by the election results and accompanying polls. More than 70% of Latinos 
favored President Obama over Mitt Romney, in no small part because of 
differences between the candidates on immigration. And 65% of voters, 
including 37% of Republican voters, indicated their support for giving 
undocumented workers in the United States a path toward legalizing their 
immigration status. See Angela Maria Kelley & Ann Garcia, A Post-Election 
Look at Immigration Reform, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2012/11/09/4467
6/a-post-election-look-at-immigration-reform/. 
My disagreement with Professor Spiro lies with the idea that states should 
be given a “longer leash” on immigration-related questions to allow “broader 
experimentation with immigration federalism.” Spiro, infra, at 108-09. 
State and local governments do not have a lot of bankable credit in the 
immigration context. To the contrary, they have accumulated well over 100 
years of experience in passing largely reactionary anti-immigrant legislation. 
There have been many state laws that explicitly restrict the freedom of 
noncitizens. Limitations on ownership of land by noncitizens, for example, 
can be found in thirty-two states today. Other laws have been facially 
neutral but applied to disadvantage noncitizens, such as the 1880 San 
Francisco ordinance prohibiting persons from operating a laundry in a 
wooden building without a permit (the subject of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
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U.S. 356 (1886)). In this sense, the Farmers Branch ordinance currently 
before the Fifth Circuit has a long pedigree. 
The impetus for state-based anti-immigrant laws is not hard to discern. 
As the Supreme Court quietly acknowledged in Arizona, some states 
disproportionately bear the consequences of unauthorized immigration. See 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). And since noncitizens 
do not vote, they make convenient scapegoats for politicians, regardless of 
whether their presence in a given state or locality truly creates a burden.  
Do states and localities sometimes try to enact pro-immigrant legisla-
tion? Yes, but such ventures are atypical. Overwhelmingly, state and local 
lawmaking is politically lopsided against immigrants. In 2011, when the spike 
of anti-immigration fervor led state legislators to introduce 1607 bills and 
resolutions relating to immigrants and refugees in all fifty states and Puerto 
Rico. Of these, 306 were enacted. The majority of those passed involved 
increasing local law enforcement efforts to identify undocumented immi-
grants, restricting the availability of identification and/or driver’s licenses 
for undocumented immigrants, and strengthening obligations for employers 
to limit the hiring of undocumented workers—all with an eye toward 
getting rid of immigrants. See BROOKE MEYER ET AL., NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESO-
LUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1–DEC. 7, 2011) 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2011ImmFinalReportDec.pdf. 
And therein lies the problem. States and localities have a strong tenden-
cy to pass laws that benefit, or simply appeal to, their voting constituents. 
Yet immigration problems are national ones involving a nonvoting popula-
tion whose protection is a matter of national interest. Thus, these issues 
demand national solutions.  
The Supreme Court recognized this in Arizona when it emphasized how 
state and local laws on immigration could affect foreign relations. See 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07. Professor Spiro argues that Arizona’s immi-
gration laws are “not going to lead us down the road to World War III.” 
Spiro, infra at 107. Perhaps. But could harsh treatment of Latin American 
immigrants undermine the State Department’s ability to gain foreign 
cooperation in the drug wars? Could the systematic oppression of Chinese 
immigrants push China toward calling in its chits on foreign debt? Could 
American inhospitality to refugees erode our moral authority in dealing 
with African dictators? To all: plausibly, yes. And the consequences could 
be dire for people in every state.  
Federal preemption plays an important role in curbing state and local 
efforts at regulating immigration. That is as it should be, because the federal 
government alone should make decisions about who will be allowed to 
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remain in the country. Immigration law must take into account myriad 
national issues, including economics, foreign relations, national security, 
human rights, and the fundamental cultural question of how America sees 
itself in the global community. Nimbyism should not chart our course. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
Pivoting to Immigration Federalism 
 
PETER J. SPIRO 
 
 Thanks to Professor Johnson for her thoughtful reply. She may have 
history on her side: the immigrant experience at the crossroads of federalism 
has not always been a happy one. Prop. 187 in California, S.B. 1070 in 
Arizona, H.B. 56 in Alabama, and the local ordinances passed by Hazleton 
and Farmers Branch have captured the modern understanding of the issue. 
Questioning this understanding runs the risk of looking friendly to  
restrictionist constituencies whose motives have not always been rights-
respecting. As Professor Johnson puts it, state and local governments do not 
have much “bankable credit” in the immigration context. Supra at 111. In 
this context, however, past performance may no longer be a predictor of 
future results. The tectonics have shifted. If state and local governments are 
given space in which to modulate immigration enforcement, there are forces 
at play to deter them from degrading immigrant interests. 
The key shift is economic globalization, which facilitates the internaliza-
tion of costs associated with anti-immigrant legislation. In the past, cracking 
down on undocumented immigrants may have presented a largely cost-free 
proposition for state and local politicians. As Professor Johnson points out, 
states and localities have “a strong tendency to pass laws that benefit or 
simply appeal to their voting constituents.” Id. 
Today, it’s not so clear that passing anti-immigrant legislation will benefit 
voting constituencies, even restrictionist ones. A recent Cato Institute study 
concluded that while Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and mandatory e-Verify legislation 
“succeeded in driving unauthorized immigrants from Arizona . . . they also 
succeeded in driving out economic growth,” contributing to declines in the 
agriculture and construction industries, and to a depressed housing market in the 
state. Alex Nowrasteh, The Economic Case Against Arizona’s Immigration Laws, 
CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS, no. 702, Sept. 25, 2012, at 12-13, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA709.pdf. One study pegs Alabama’s losses from 
H.B. 56 in the billions of dollars. See SAMUEL ADDY, CTR. FOR BUS. AND 
ECON. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF ALA., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE NEW 
ALABAMA IMMIGRATION LAW 1 (2012), available at http://cber.cba.ua.edu/ 
New%20AL%20Immigration%20Law%20-%20Costs%20and%20Benefits.pdf. 
Even before the Supreme Court gutted the Arizona law, other states were 
standing down from copycat laws in the face of these rising costs. In Mississippi 
and Tennessee (prime candidates for the anti-undocumented immigrant  
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bandwagon), a powerful alliance of immigrant advocates and business interests 
successfully headed off Arizona-type enactments. Professor Johnson notes that 
over fifteen hundred immigration-related bills were introduced in state legisla-
tures last year. Of the two hundred and fifty enacted, the majority were actually 
favorable to immigrant interests on such issues as refugee assistance, human 
trafficking, immigrant education, and healthcare. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLU-
TIONS IN THE STATES (JANUARY-JUNE) (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/statefed/IMMIG_REPORT_FINALAUG9.pdf. 
An exodus of undocumented immigrants accounts for short-term eco-
nomic losses as it constricts the labor supply. But a tarnished state brand is 
also part of the picture, which poses the threat of redirected foreign invest-
ment. Among those first arrested under the “papers please” provision of 
H.B. 56 in Alabama was a German Mercedes-Benz executive, an episode 
unlikely to help Alabama the next time it is courting foreign manufacturers 
for future multibillion-dollar undertakings in the state. (One of Germany’s 
major newspapers sarcastically recounted a similar story involving a Honda 
executive visiting from Japan who was briefly jailed even though he had his 
passport in hand: “Maybe the Alabama police couldn’t make anything out 
of the Japanese characters.” Eva C. Schweitzer, Latinos Trauen Sich Nicht 
Mehr in die Kirche, DIE ZEIT ONLINE (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www. 
zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2011-12/alabama-auslaendergesetz.) In the 
wake of S.B. 1070, the Mexican government issued a travel advisory for its 
nationals in Arizona warning that “every Mexican citizen may be harassed 
and questioned without further cause at any time.” Secretería de Relaciones 
Exteriores, Travel Alert (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.sre. 
gob.mx/csocial_viejo/contenido/comunicados/2010/abr/cp_121eng.html. As 
the head of Tucson’s Convention and Visitors Bureau reported after a 
recent trade mission to Mexico, “Arizona’s reputation after passage of SB 
1070 . . . [is] negatively impacting Mexican investment in Arizona.” 
Brent DeRaad, Fostering Trade and Tourism Relations with Mexico, TUCSON 
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.insidetucsonbusiness 
.com/news/inside_business_travel/fostering-trade-and-tourism-relationswith-
mexico/article_42a5eb50-fdd7-11e1-b97c-001a4bcf887a.html. See also Dan-
ielle Kurtzleben, Arizona Businesses Hope to Put SB 1070 Behind Them, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 25, 2012), http://www.usnews .com/ 
news/articles/2012/06/25/arizona-businesses-hope-to-put-sb-1070-behind-them.  
It is no surprise that the harm is targeted at Arizona and not the United 
States as a whole. Mexican and other foreign policymakers have a sophisti-
cated understanding of U.S. politics and constitutional structure. They 
know that when Arizona or Alabama enacts a misguided immigration 
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measure, the state is responsible and there is often little the federal gov-
ernment can do about it. Mexico denounced S.B. 1070, but that denuncia-
tion was directed at the state, not the federal government. When Mexican 
President Felipe Calderón paid a state visit to Washington in May 2010, he 
and President Obama expressed united opposition to the measure. 
To answer Professor Johnson’s question, then, to the extent the conse-
quences of such measures are dire, they are likely to be dire for the acting 
state or locality, not the United States as a nation. That reality erodes the 
foundation of the broad preemption doctrine of cases like Chy Lung, Hines, 
and Arizona itself. To the extent that foreign responses are targeted at 
acting states, those states will suffer the consequences, not the rest of us. 
Targeted retaliation raises the probability of self-correction. Even if the 
states were given free rein, in other words, we would see very few enacting 
consequential anti-immigrant measures. And those that would enact such 
laws would be unlikely to keep them for very long. 
But before we try to stamp out subfederal policymaking altogether, con-
sider the costs. If immigrant interests alone could dictate immigration 
reform, it might make sense to stamp out subfederal discretion. But those 
interests are not the only ones that will govern when Congress takes up 
comprehensive immigration reform in the new year. Even if the Republican 
Party’s presidential nominee suffered because of his views on immigration, 
it’s not so clear that GOP House members did. Ensconced in safe districts, 
many of them are more anxious about primary challenges from the right 
than about winning over Hispanic voters. They will have to be dragged into 
immigration reform, and they will not sign off on any package that does not 
include enforcement-related provisions.  
Validating state and local co-activity on the enforcement side might 
suffice to buy off restrictionist interests—a way for Republican legislators to 
deliver on their promises to their restrictionist constituencies without 
taking comprehensive reform down with them. (There is already a “junior 
varsity” version of this kind of trade in place in the so-called 287(g) pro-
gram, under which states and localities can be deputized to undertake 
enforcement under federal supervision.) See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immi-
gration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, IMMIG. AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/ 
287g.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2013.) In the long run, states and cities won’t 
take advantage of the discretion Congress affords them very often—or for 
very long—now that the costs are clear. By making federalism a part of 
immigration reform, and by letting restrictionists blow off a little steam in 
the process, Congress and the courts could help seal an immigration deal 
that better serves immigrant interests. At the same time, assimilating a 
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place for subfederal discretion would validate pro-immigrant local experi-
mentation that could inform national reform efforts. By losing a battle here 
and there, pro-immigrant reformers might win the war. 
The Fifth Circuit will surely stick with the foreign affairs reasoning of  
Arizona in striking down the Farmers Branch ordinance at issue in Villas Partners. 
But this will hardly be the last chapter in the story of immigration federalism. 
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